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Cross-Border Litigation in England and Wales: Pre-Brexit Data 
and Post-Brexit Implications 
Mihail Danov* 
1 Introduction  
Traditionally, private international law (‘PIL’)1 forms an important part within each national 
legal system - England and Wales would normally have its own PIL rules, and so too would 
Scotland and France. The existence of multiple sets of national PIL rules which apply in 
different jurisdictions could generate a level of legal uncertainty which in turn would increase 
the parties’ exposure to litigation risks in disputes with an international element. This would 
inflate the cross-border litigation costs, reflecting the level of variation with regard to the 
connecting factors chosen by national policy-makers to ascertain the applicable law and/or 
allocate jurisdiction. Addressing these issues, in terms of providing private parties with access 
to remedies, at EU level was important in view of the fact that the EU has promoted cross-
border trade and services within the single market which inter alia contributed to the higher 
mobility of people across different jurisdictions.  
In order to facilitate private parties’ access to justice in disputes with an international 
element, the EU has “develop[ed] judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-border 
implications”2 by harmonising PIL rules.3 A number of EU PIL Regulations4 adopted at EU 
level created the foundation of the EU Civil Justice framework which was set to facilitate 
private parties’ effective access to legal remedies in disputes with an international element.5 
The objective has been to minimise the cross-border litigation risks, removing (or, at least, 
minimising) the barriers to justice (i.e. higher legal uncertainty and higher litigation costs) in 
                                                          
* Associate Professor, School of Law, University of Exeter, England, M.Danov@exeter.ac.uk. The author is 
very thankful to Professor Beaumont from the University of Aberdeen for his helpful remarks and edits on a 
previous version of this article. The gratitude is extended to two anonymous reviewers for their valuable 
comments and suggestions. The errors that remain are mine and mine alone. 
1 Private International Law (‘PIL’) for the purposes of this article is broadly defined to cover any set of national 
PIL rules. Respectively, EU PIL (referring to the EU harmonised PIL instruments) and/or English PIL (referring 
to the English common law rules) and/or Global PIL (referring to the Hague conventions). 
2 See Article 81 TFEU. 
3 P. Beaumont and M. Danov, ‘The EU Civil Justice Framework and Private Law: “Integration through [Private 
International] Law”’ (2015) 22 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 706. 
4 Eg Council Regulation 1215/2012 (‘Brussels I recast’); Council Regulation 593/2008 (‘Rome I’); Council 
Regulation 864/2007 (‘Rome II’); Council Regulation 2201/2003 (‘Brussels IIa’); and Council Regulation 
4/2009 (‘Maintenance Regulation’). 
5 M. Danov and P. Beaumont, ‘Measuring the Effectiveness of the EU Civil Justice Framework: Theoretical and 
Methodological Challenges’ (2015/2016) 17 Yearbook of Private International Law 151-180. 
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disputes with an international element. As a result, the current UK legal landscape in relation 
to PIL in civil and commercial matters has been largely designed at EU level.  
The EU PIL legislative developments have significantly affected the English common 
law and the legal practice in cross-border disputes before the English courts.6 It is now well 
established that, in civil and commercial disputes, “the decision in Owusu v Jackson prevents 
any consideration of the forum non conveniens principle when the defendant, or one of the 
defendants, is domiciled in the UK.”7 The impact of the EU PIL family law on English law had 
been acknowledged by Lady Justice Black, stating that the “recourse to the inherent jurisdiction 
[is] through the Brussels IIa jurisdiction provisions not in spite of them.”8 In other words, EU 
PIL forms an integral and important part of the English legal landscape within which the 
companies and individuals would have to navigate in order to properly administer their cross-
border private law relationships.  
The UK decision to leave the EU strongly suggests that the legal landscape in relation to 
PIL in England and Wales would require a major redesign. A change in the legal landscape in 
relation to PIL would bring new challenges for UK policy-makers as well as for judges and 
litigants in cross-border cases before the English and Welsh courts. The UK policy-makers will 
have to consider how to re-shape the UK PIL regime, whilst EU policy-makers need to assess 
the impact of the UK decision to leave the European Union on the EU civil justice system, in 
order to identify how it should be reformed. In the post-Brexit era, there is a need for 
appropriate arrangements to be made between the UK and EU with a view to creating an 
effectively functioning regime which serves the interests of businesses and individuals by 
facilitating private parties’ access to remedies in cross-border cases. This appears to be 
                                                          
6 A. Dickinson, ‘Back to the future: the UK’s EU exit and the conflict of laws’ (2016) 12 Journal of Private 
International Law, 195, 196. A. Briggs, ‘Secession from the European Union and private international law: the 
cloud with a silver lining’ - Lecture to the COMBAR Association on 24 January 2017 < 
https://www.blackstonechambers.com/documents/311/Secession_from_the_European_Union_and_private_inter
national_law.pdf > p 4. 
7 Dominic Liswaniso Lungowe & Others v Vedanta Resources Plc and Konkola Copper Mines Plc [2016] 
EWHC 975 (TCC) [56] aff’d [2017] EWCA Civ 1528. See also: Case C-281/02, Andrew Owusu v N. B. 
Jackson, trading as "Villa Holidays Bal-Inn Villas" and Others ECLI:EU:C:2005:120; Global Multimedia 
International Ltd v Ara Media Services [2006] EWHC 3612 (Ch) [34]; Attorney General of Zambia v Meer 
Care & Desai (A Firm) [2006] EWCA Civ 390 [24]; UBS AG v HSH Nordbank AG [2009] EWCA Civ 585 
[103]; In the matter of A (Children) [2013] UKSC 60 [31]. 
8 Re J (A Child) (1996 Hague Convention) (Morocco) [2015] EWCA Civ 329 [74]. See also: In the matter of A 
(Children) [2013] UKSC 60 [59]. 
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acknowledged by the European Commission’s Position Paper on Judicial cooperation in civil 
and commercial matters9 as well as by the UK Government’s Future Partnership Paper.10 
Devising an effectively functioning regime in relation to PIL in England and Wales, post-
Brexit, presupposes a careful analysis of the relationship between the relevant PIL rules (ie be 
they EU PIL or English PIL rules), parties’ strategies and access to remedies. Any fresh legal 
uncertainty in relation to PIL could impact on the settlement dynamics and parties’ strategies, 
creating incentives for litigants to exploit any post-Brexit driven ambiguity and gain 
negotiating advantages which could adversely affect their opponent’s access to remedies in 
disputes with an international element.11  
There is a need for a theoretical framework which allows for systematic analysis of 
existing pre-Brexit data and future data (capturing potential and actual Brexit impact) because 
any change in the UK legal framework might have significant implications for the parties’ 
access to justice in cross-border cases before the English courts. The assessment of the Brexit 
impact pre-supposes such a theoretical framework for data analysis which captures the 
litigation pattern (considering the relationship between the relevant set/s of PIL rules and 
private parties’ strategies) in cross-border family law disputes as well as in civil and 
commercial law disputes with an international element. This should allow for some 
comparisons not only between the pre-Brexit and post-Brexit data, but also between data 
concerning different types of family, civil and commercial disputes. 
The aim of this article is to propose a theoretical framework for the relevant data analysis 
by the EU and UK policy-makers when deciding on any future regime for judicial cooperation. 
The proposed framework could be used when comparing existing (ie pre-Brexit data) with 
newly gathered data with a view to assessing the Brexit impact on the EU/UK policy facilitating 
access to justice in cross-border cases as well as on the recognition and enforcement of the UK 
courts’ judgments across the EU and the recognition and enforcement of the EU Member States 
                                                          
9 European Commission - Task Force for the Preparation and Conduct of the Negotiations with the United 
Kingdom under Article 50 TEU, ‘Position paper transmitted to EU27 on Judicial Cooperation in Civil and 
Commercial Matters’ – 28 June 2017 < https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/essential_principles_judicial_cooperation_in_civil_and_commercial_matters.pdf >. 
10 HM Government ‘Providing a cross-border civil judicial cooperation framework: A future partnership paper’ 
< https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/639271/Providing_a_cross-
border_civil_judicial_cooperation_framework.pdf >. 
11 M. Danov and S. Bariatti, ‘The Relationship between Litigation and ADR: Evaluating the Effect of the EU 
PIL Framework on ADR/Settlements in Cross-Border Cases’ in P. Beaumont, M. Danov, K. Trimmings and B. 
Yuksel (eds), Cross-Border Litigation in Europe (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2017) 689-707. See also: M. Danov 
and P. Beaumont), ‘Effective Remedies in Cross-Border Civil and Commercial Law Disputes: A Case for an 
Institutional Reform at EU Level’ in P. Beaumont, M. Danov, K. Trimmings and B. Yuksel (eds), Cross-Border 
Litigation in Europe (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2017) 603-622. 
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courts’ judgments in the UK. The author will make a case that there must be a constructive 
alignment of the policy objectives to be pursued in cross-border cases and the needs of the 
businesses and individuals in disputes with an international element. In other words, achieving 
a level of constructive alignment between the parties’ legitimate goals in cross-border cases 
and the policy-makers’ objectives in devising a legal landscape in relation to PIL is a necessary 
pre-condition for designing an appropriately functioning institutional framework post-Brexit. 
2 Research Methodology and Theoretical Framework: A Purposive and Pragmatic 
Approach  
It should be noted that a newly gathered empirical data will be necessary to identify how a 
change in the post-Brexit legal landscape in relation to PIL would impact on private parties’ 
access to remedies in cross-border cases before the English courts. It is not possible to do this, 
without considering how the current regime is functioning.12 Any such assessment of the 
impact of Brexit must draw on an analysis which identifies the factors that facilitate/impair 
access to justice in disputes with an international element under the current EU PIL regime.  
Some recent academic papers have considered various aspects/challenges for litigants 
and UK/EU policy-makers in disputes with an international element arising in a post-Brexit 
context.13 Briggs14 has captured well the impact which Brexit may have on some of the relevant 
legal literature by noting that “[i]t could mean that about half the pages in the current edition 
of Dicey – the better half, as some would say – could be torn out and thrown away.”15 The UK 
Government’s future partnership agenda aims to continue to promote a level of judicial 
cooperation with the EU Member States, stating that: 
“The UK is clear that international civil judicial cooperation is in the mutual interest of 
consumers, citizens, families and businesses in the EU and in the UK. With this in mind, we are 
seeking a close and comprehensive framework of civil judicial cooperation with the EU. That 
framework would be on a reciprocal basis, which would mirror closely the current EU system 
and would provide a clear legal basis to support cross-border activities, after the UK’s 
withdrawal.”16 
 
                                                          
12 Beaumont et al, supra n 11. 
13 Dickinson, supra n 6; Briggs, supra n 6; R. Aikens and A. Dinsmore, ‘Jurisdiction, Enforcement and the 
Conflict of Laws in Cross-Border Commercial Disputes: What Are the Legal Consequences of Brexit?' (2016) 
European Business Law Review 903; M Ahmed, 'BREXIT and English Jurisdiction Agreements: The Post-
Referendum Legal Landscape' (2016) European Business Law Review pp. 989; J. Fitchen, ‘The Private 
International Law consequences of Brexit’ (2017) Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht (NIPR) 411; M. 
Pilich, ‘Brexit and EU private international law: May the UK stay in? (2017) 24 Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law 382. 
14 Briggs, supra n 6. 
15 Ibid p 4. 
16 A future partnership paper, supra n 10, [25]. 
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A Sub-Committee forming part of the UK Parliament’s Select Committee on the 
European Union gathered evidence from prominent legal practitioners and academics, 
considering inter alia the various policy options (e.g. common law, Brussels I, Brussels Ia and 
IIa, Lugano, The Hague Choice-of-Court Agreements) concerning the re-design of the UK 
legal landscape post-Brexit.17 The difficulties in determining the Brexit impact were exposed 
by the fact that a number of “academic and legal witnesses differed on the post-Brexit 
enforceability of UK judgments”.18 Such a difference in the opinions19 indicates how difficult 
is to evaluate the Brexit impact and identify the appropriate policy-options.  
The recent developments (more compellingly than ever before) call for a new approach 
for doing research in PIL. This deduction could be sustained from the evidence provided, to 
the Justice Sub-committee, by Fentiman who submits that “in the realm of commercial law 
[…] disputes never go to judgment. […] In other words, you simply will not reach the point at 
which you have a judgment which needs to be enforced.”20 This is one of the important 
arguments, supporting his view that the non-application of Brussels Ia should not be seen as a 
significant disadvantage which is further sustained by the findings of the BIICL Report.21  
But, surely all the previous studies (ie pre-Brexit data) were seeking to identify the factors 
which impacted on the forum-selection process at the time when the data was collected (ie 
February – June 2014 – BIICL Report), with all the respondents naturally making the 
assumption that the legal landscape will not significantly change (ie Brussels I regime will 
                                                          
17 House of Lords – European Union Committee, ‘Brexit: justice for families, individuals and businesses?’ HL 
Paper 134 < https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldeucom/134/134.pdf >. 
18 Ibid [52]. 
19 L Merrett and R Fentiman, ‘Oral Evidence presented to the House of Lords’ Select Committee on the 
European Union – Justice Sub-Committee - Tuesday 6 December 2016 at 10.45 am < 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-justice-
subcommittee/brexit-civil-justice-cooperation/oral/44259.html > Responses to Questions 1 and 2; A Briggs — 
Written evidence (CJC0002), ‘Secession from the European Union and Private International Law’ < 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-justice-
subcommittee/brexit-civil-justice-cooperation/written/46823.html >. Compare: D Greene, H Raulus, T Scott and 
H Mercer, ‘Oral Evidence presented to the House of Lords’ Select Committee on the European Union – Justice 
Sub-Committee - Tuesday 10 January 2017 at 10.45 am < 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-justice-
subcommittee/brexit-civil-justice-cooperation/oral/45378.html >; J Harris, R Lord and O Jones ‘Oral Evidence 
presented to the House of Lords’ Select Committee on the European Union – Justice Sub-Committee - Tuesday 
13 December 2016 at 10.45 am < 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-justice-
subcommittee/brexit-civil-justice-cooperation/oral/44510.html >. 
20 Fentiman, ‘Oral Evidence’, supra n 19, Response to Question 2. 
21 Ibid. See also: E. Lein et al, ‘Factors Influencing International Litigants’ Decisions to Bring Commercial 
Claims to the London Based Courts (‘BIICL Report’)’ < 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/396343/factors-influencing-
international-litigants-with-commercial-claims.pdf >. Compare: H. Mercer QC, ‘Oral Evidence’, supra n 19, 
Response to Question 28. 
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continue to apply within the UK). A new data is necessary to find out whether and/or how (if 
at all) the non-application of Brussels Ia will impact on the attractiveness of the English courts. 
More importantly, a new data is needed to find out whether (and how) a change in the legal 
landscape would impact on the settlement dynamics. Even if there is no change in the rate of 
settlements post-Brexit, it is important to see whether a modification in the legal landscape 
would impact on the parties’ decisions whether/where to issue proceedings as well as on 
litigants’ strategies which could in turn impact on the settlement dynamics (eg the level of 
settlement discount could become higher/lower).  
It is well established that “[o]ne way to find out what is going on as lawyers do such 
things as planning transactions or crafting litigation strategy is to find an insider willing to be 
interviewed”,22 so that a new set of qualitative interviews with legal practitioners (who should 
be randomly selected out of an appropriately designed sampling framework) would be much 
needed. Indeed, a systematic analysis of the Brexit impact on the cross-border litigation pattern 
in England and Wales presupposes the construction of a theoretical model (and then the 
adoption of an appropriate research methodology) that should take account of the relationship 
between PIL rules (shaping the litigants’ strategies) and parties’ access to remedies in cross-
border cases. A “theory of legal strategy”23 appears to suggest that: 
“‘Law’ has direct effect through the rendition and enforcement of judgments in actual cases and 
indirect effect through the anticipation of such rendition and enforcement in hypothetical cases. 
Each such case is a complex undertaking that may require hundreds of strategic decisions by the 
parties and generate an indefinite number of actual or potential legal issues and extra-legal 
problems”24 
 
Whilst it is persuasive to say that “a central thrust of legal strategy is to control legal 
outcomes”25, one should not forget that claimants and defendants will have entirely different 
objectives. If a claimant’s goal was to swiftly obtain a legal remedy in a cross-border case, then 
the potential defendant could decide to make it difficult for the claimant, raising various 
“barriers to conflict resolution”.26 The relevant PIL rules would have an important role in 
shaping the claimants/defendants’ legal strategies because the PIL rules ascertain the applicable 
substantive laws (determining parties’ entitlement to remedies in cross-border cases) and 
specify the competent national court (impacting on access to remedies by defining the relevant 
                                                          
22 S Macaulay, ‘New Legal Realism: Unpacking a Proposed Definition’ (2016) 6 UC Irvine Law Review 149, 
164. 
23 L. M. LoPucki and W. O. Weyrauch, ‘A Theory of Legal Strategy’ (2000) 49 Duke Law Journal 1405.  
24 Ibid 1412. 
25 Ibid 1411. 
26 R H Mnookin and L Ross, ‘Introduction’ in K Arrow et al (eds), Barriers to Conflict Resolution (W W Norton 
& Company, 1995) 1, 6-24. 
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procedural rules as well as revealing whether a rendered judgment will benefit from any 
bilateral and/or multilateral regime for the recognition and enforcement). Hence, the litigants’ 
strategies, which are devised under the relevant set of applicable PIL rules, do have a major 
impact on the triangular relationship (jurisdiction – choice of law – access to legal remedies).27 
The proposed theoretical model for data analysis draws on the EUPILLAR project28 
which assessed the effectiveness of the EU PIL framework and identified the weaknesses of 
the current EU institutional framework by analysing the relationship between the relevant EU 
PIL rules and private parties’ access to remedies in cross-border cases. A strong and original 
feature of the theoretical model which has been applied in EUPILLAR is that our analysis 
considers the relationship between the EU PIL rules and the litigants’ strategies which in turn 
will have a bearing on the parties’ decision to sue and/or settle as well as on the settlement 
negotiations and parties’ access to remedies in cross-border cases. Central to this analysis is 
the triangular relationship between the rules allocating jurisdiction and ascertaining the 
applicable law, on the one hand, and the private parties’ ability to obtain a desirable legal 
remedy (which might require the recognition and enforcement of an English judgement 
abroad), on the other hand.29 This theoretical framework allowed us to consider the context in 
which the PIL rules are set to be applied.  
The EUPILLAR data analysis shows that a level of tactical manoeuvring by private 
parties in disputes with an international element is the most dynamic factor to be considered 
when identifying the aspects which may impair litigants’ effective access to remedies under 
the current EU PIL rules. The litigants’ strategies, which are often devised to exploit the 
weaknesses of EU PIL regime and/or the deficiencies of national legal system, are the central 
factor which would affect the expectations of the parties about the outcome (ie raising 
psychological barriers affecting the suing decision and settlement dynamics) and access to 
justice under the EU civil justice system (ie raising institutional barriers) exposing the 
ineffectiveness of the adopted PIL instruments.30 Due to the specific nature of cross-border 
disputes, it was particularly important to consider whether/how the weaknesses of the EU 
institutional framework could be exploited by strategic litigants.31  For these purposes, datasets 
for the civil and commercial and family PIL cases before the English and Welsh courts were 
                                                          
27 Danov and Beaumont, supra n 5. 
28 Danov and Beaumont, supra n 5. 
29 Danov and Beaumont, supra n 5. 
30 P. Beaumont, M. Danov, K. Trimmings and B. Yüksel, ‘Cross-border Litigation in Europe: Some Theoretical 
Issues and Some Practical Challenges’ in Beaumont et al, supra n 11, 817-830. 
31 See more Danov and Bariatti, supra n 11. 
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compiled for the period from 1 March 2002 up to 2015.32 This included 354 cases, involving 
on some occasions more than one judgment; 427 judgments rendered in these cases have now 
been summarised on the project web site.33  
The gathered quantitative/qualitative data from the case law datasets was cross-checked 
with the qualitative data from the research interviews. It should be noted that the sampling 
framework,34 which was used when randomly selecting interview participants in England and 
Wales, included over 1700 names of legal practitioners (including judges), with 20 interviews, 
being conducted in England and Wales.35 In the latter context, qualitative interviews with legal 
practitioners were conducted, in order to determine how the EU PIL framework was shaping 
litigants’ strategies36 which may in turn indirectly impact on ADR/settlements negotiation.37 
Therefore, in order to set the agenda for the PIL community to consider in the post-Brexit era, 
the author relies on empirical (qualitative) data which was gathered in 2015 and early 2016 in 
the context of the EUPILLAR project.38 This might turn out to be the last set of interview data 
which captures how the legal regime was functioning before the Brexit vote from June 2016. 
An analysis of the existing data, considering the relationship between litigants’ strategies and 
parties’ access to remedies in the pre-Brexit era, should indicate what type of data is needed to 
inform the design of a governance model in a post-Brexit context. 
The pre-Brexit data appears to shed light on the way in which the EU PIL framework 
shaped the litigants’ strategies, identifying the weaknesses of the EU PIL rules in place.39  A 
careful consideration of the relationship between parties’ strategies and access to legal 
remedies in cross-border cases under the pre-Brexit EU PIL framework should make it possible 
to identify the challenges for the UK policy-makers as well as the opportunities/incentives for 
the UK to maintain a good working relationship with its current EU partners, whilst 
contributing to the creation a global framework for judicial co-operation in civil and 
                                                          
32 See more about the research methodology in Chapters 1 and 5 in Beaumont et al, supra n 11. See also Danov 
and Beaumont, supra n 5.  
33 The EUPILLAR Database < http://www.abdn.ac.uk/law/research/eupillar-database-559.php >. It should be 
noted that the last search was done in the summer of 2015, so that the datasets include only a small proportion of 
the cases in 2015. 
34 A Wilmot, 'Designing sampling strategies for qualitative social research: with particular reference to the Office 
for National Statistics' qualitative respondent register' (2005), Paper on qualitative sampling strategies presented 
to QUEST 2005, Office of National Statistics < http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/method-
quality/general-methodology/data-collection-methodology/reports-and-publications/index.html?format=print > 
35 P. Beaumont, M. Danov, K. Trimmings and B. Yüksel, ‘Great Britain’ in Beaumont et al, supra n 11, 79-124.  
36 Ibid.  See also: Danov and Beaumont, supra n 11. 
37 The Right Honourable the Lord Woolf, Access to Justice – Final Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil 
Justice System in England and Wales (HMSO, 1996) 107. See more: Danov and Bariatti, supra n 11. 
38 Beaumont, Danov, Trimmings and Yüksel, supra n 35. 
39 Ibid. See also: Beaumont and Danov, supra n 11. Danov and Bariatti, supra n 11 
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commercial matters. Indeed, some systematic comparisons between the existing pre-Brexit 
data and the future post-Brexit data (capturing the impact of any potential and actual changes 
in the legal landscape on the litigants’ strategies) should indicate the optimal policy option/s 
which should be pursued by policy-makers.  
In order to construct a theoretical model for data analysis, the author will highlight the 
relationship between the elements of private parties’ access to legal remedies and litigants’ 
strategies in cross-border cases under the current EU PIL framework. The EUPILLAR project40 
shows that the policy objectives (ie certainty and predictability as prerequisites to facilitating 
parties’ access to justice) which are reflected in the EU PIL rules are only achievable if the 
institutional framework is effectively functioning. There are several important factors which 
should be considered with a view to identifying the aspects that could impair private parties’ 
access to remedies, shaping the triangular relationship (See Figure 1, jurisdiction – choice of 
law – remedy). In particular, there are two major elements of “the right to an effective 
remedy”41 which should be considered in cross-border cases.  
First, it is important to outline that the private parties’ entitlement to legal remedies would 
be dependent on laws which should be applied by the judges to determine the rights and 
obligations of the parties in cross-border cases. In this context, the author relies on the 
EUPILLAR empirical data which is used to determine how effectively the parties’ entitlement 
to remedies could be ascertained under Rome I and II. Hence, the aspects which impact on the 
parties’ decisions whether to embark on a dispute about the applicable law under the current 
EU PIL should be considered. On this basis, the author will consider what type of new empirical 
data will be required with a view to assessing the impact of Brexit on private parties’ access to 
justice in cross-border cases.  
Secondly, the litigants’ access to legal remedies may be subject to various sets of 
procedural provisions which may be applicable depending on the place where the parties 
litigate. This means that the applicable procedural rules may be dependent on establishing 
jurisdiction before an appropriate Member State court.42 In order to factor these developments 
in, the proposed theoretical model considers the relationship between the disputes about the 
jurisdiction of the court seised and the parties’ access to remedies in cross-border cases. A 
review of the reported cases under the current EU PIL framework appears to demonstrate that 
                                                          
40 Beaumont et al, supra n 11. 
41 Art 47(1) and (2) of the Charter of Fundamental Human Rights. See also Recital 38 to Brussels Ia. See more: 
M. Danov, ‘Data Analysis: Important Issues to be Considered in a Cross-Border Context’ in Beaumont et al, 
supra n 11, 475-495. 
42 Danov, supra n 41. 
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the jurisdictional challenges are quite common in cross-border disputes before the English 
courts.43 An analysis of the behaviour of the claimant helpfully identifies the factors which 
impact on his decision to issue proceedings in this country and seek his desired remedy from 
the English courts. Equally important for the author is to identify the factors which impact on 
the defendant’s decision to challenge jurisdiction of the English courts. 
Figure 1 
 
 
 The EUPILLAR empirical data helpfully indicates how effectively jurisdiction may be 
established under Brussels Ia and IIa as well as whether the rendered judgment will be 
recognised and enforced abroad. Both aspects are cumulatively important pre-conditions for 
private parties’ access to legal remedies in cross-border cases which might impact on the forum 
selection process. This framework for data analysis should allow for the collection of some 
new and relevant data which should indicate how the legal landscape in relation to PIL should 
be designed post-Brexit. In theory, any change in the legal landscape in relation to PIL – in so 
far as it shapes the litigants’ strategies - may have significant implications for the parties’ access 
to legal remedies in cross-border cases. Therefore, this theoretical framework, whilst modelled 
on the EUPILLAR paradigm for data analysis, could be used for the relevant data analyses 
which are necessary to assess the impact of Brexit on the resolution of cross-border disputes in 
                                                          
43 Beaumont, Danov, Trimmings and Yüksel, supra n 35. 
Litigants' 
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England and Wales. Indeed, as already noted above, a new and relevant empirical data will be 
needed to measure the impact of Brexit on parties’ strategies in this context.  
More importantly, devising an effectively functioning PIL framework also presupposes 
that the policy-makers set out clear objectives which could reasonably be pursued through the 
adoption of relevant PIL provisions. To this end, it is important to identify the policy options 
which would be relevant, and could be effectively and efficiently44 pursued through PIL 
instruments. It is also important to agree upon the objectives which are to be pursued by the 
PIL regime.  Mills has recently noted that “the primary motivation for the EU in pursuing 
multilateral harmonization of private international law is likely to be the potential for economic 
benefits to the EU itself from increased efficiency in global cross-border activity.”45 Although 
this could hardly be a directly and fully achievable objective through any PIL instrument, one 
could see an indirect link between an appropriately designed global legal landscape (which 
allows the parties to obtain effective legal remedies) and the need to reduce the cross-border 
litigation risks (which may have an impact on the costs for doing business across borders). But, 
significant economic benefits could hardly be a realistic objective which could be pursued by 
using PIL instruments (even global PIL instruments).  
Nonetheless, facilitating litigants’ access to justice by providing private parties with legal 
certainty about how their rights and obligations would be ascertained in cross-border disputes 
could well be a direct objective which could reasonably be pursued through PIL.  A support 
for the proposed theory could be derived from the EUPILLAR project which demonstrates that 
the parties’ decisions where/whether to bring their cross-border claims is preceded by a careful 
cost-remedy analysis,46 factoring in the cross-border litigation risks. That said, the EUPILLAR 
project also shows that specifying a relevant policy objective (eg allowing parties to obtain an 
effective remedy in cross-border cases) does not necessarily mean that this objective would be 
fully achieved (or even be fully achievable), if the adopted PIL framework is not effectively 
functioning. In other words, the means through which the agreed objectives are to be pursued 
need to be carefully considered by the EU/UK policy-makers. The author proposes a purposive 
and pragmatic approach which allows for designing a legal landscape in relation to PIL that 
                                                          
44 F. Varone,  B. Rihoux, and A Marx, ‘A New Method for Policy Evaluation? Longstanding Challenges and the 
Possibilities of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)’ in B. Rihoux and H. Grimm (eds), Innovative 
Comparative Methods for Policy Analysis (Springer, 2006) 213, 215 
45 A Mills, ‘Private International Law and EU External Relations: Think Local Act Global or Think Global Act 
Local’ (2016) 65 ICLQ 541, 551. 
46 See more Section III below. 
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aligns the policy-makers’ objective to facilitate effective access to justice with the litigants’ 
objective to achieve a result in cross-border cases.  
The proposed approach is in line with the different initiatives for harmonisation of PIL 
through regulations and/or conventions which appear to be aiming to facilitate private parties’ 
effective access to remedies in cross-border cases.47 This is clearly reflected in the relevant EU 
legislative instruments,48 but more importantly in the objectives of the newly proposed text of 
the Global Judgments Convention.49 The Report of the Working Group on the Hague 
Conference Global Judgments Project specifies that the proposed conventions aims to “enhance 
access to justice through the recognition and enforcement of judgments given by courts which 
the parties could reasonably have expected to determine their rights and obligations in the 
circumstances of the particular case.”50 
 
3 Entitlement to a Legal Remedy: Applicable Law and Cost-Benefit 
Analysis  
It is well established that, in domestic cases, the parties’ decision to issue legal proceedings is 
preceded by a careful analysis which compares the value of the remedies (ie desired result) that 
a claimant would be entitled to pursue (and the probability to achieve the result51), on the one 
hand, and the litigation expenses he would have to meet, on the other hand.52 In cross-border 
cases, there would be an added layer of complexity because there would potentially be, at least, 
two legal regimes (ie sets of substantive laws) which may be relevant when determining the 
rights and obligations of the parties. This means that the parties’ entitlement to legal remedies 
would have to be ascertained under the applicable law identified through the application of the 
relevant PIL rules which, along with the relevant institutional framework in place, would shape 
the parties’ strategies.  
Any legal uncertainty/ambiguity about the applicable law and/or the way the PIL rules 
should be interpreted could generate a level of delay which would impact on the parties’ 
                                                          
47 Danov and Beaumont, supra n 5. 
48 Eg Recital 38 of Council Regulation 1215/2012 (‘Brussels I recast’). 
49 Special Commission on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (16-24 Feb 2017), ‘February 
2017 Draft Convention’ < https://assets.hcch.net/docs/d6f58225-0427-4a65-8f8b-180e79cafdbb.pdf >. 
50 Report of the Fifth Meeting of the Working Group on the Judgments Project (26-31 October 2015) and 
Proposed Draft Text Resulting from the Meeting < https://assets.hcch.net/docs/06811e9c-dddf-4619-81af-
71e8836c8d3e.pdf > p 3. 
51 H Genn, ‘Understanding Civil Justice’ (1997) 50 Current Legal Problems 155. 
52 R A Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (8th edn, WoltersKluwer, 2001) 761 – 767. See also R A Posner, ‘An 
economic approach to legal procedure and judicial administration’ (1973) Journal of Legal Studies 399; W A 
Landes and R A Posner, ‘Adjudication as a private good’ (1979) Journal of Legal Studies 235. 
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remedy-cost balancing exercise. In particular, a level of legal uncertainty about the applicable 
law could result in a dispute between the parties on this issue. Any prolonged dispute, on such 
a preliminary issue as the applicable law is, would raise the litigation costs and adversely affect 
the parties’ expectations about the outcome of the dispute. In other words, the litigation costs 
might be higher in a cross-border case because, assuming that everything else is equal as in a 
domestic case (and assuming the jurisdiction of the national court is not challenged53), the 
parties may disagree about the law which should apply to the merits of their dispute. Therefore, 
ascertaining the rights and obligations of the parties (being a difficult enough undertaking in 
domestic disputes) could be a very complex task in cross-border cases where the litigants 
disagree about the applicable law and/or its content.  
Although the EUPILLAR project54 shows that the disputes about the applicable law are 
far less common than the jurisdictional battles before the English courts in cross-border cases,55 
a careful analysis of the collected data shows that the higher the value of the legal remedy to 
which a party is entitled to recover under the applicable set of laws, the more likely the party 
is to issue proceedings.56 There is a strong case that, due to the fact that the parties’ entitlement 
to legal remedies depends on the law which is applicable to the merits of the cross-border 
disputes, any ambiguity/uncertainty with regard to the relevant PIL rules would impact on 
parties’ behaviour in such cases. One way for the parties to minimise the level of legal 
uncertainty with regard to the applicable law which is to be used to ascertain the parties’ rights 
and obligations is to include a choice-of-law clause as part of their contract. This appears to 
explain why choice-of-law clauses (and indeed choice-of-court agreements57) form part of the 
terms of many cross-border transactions nowadays.  
An ineffectively functioning PIL regime may impair private parties’ access to remedies 
in cross-border cases.58 A review of the case law and the EUPILLAR data59 shows that there 
is a complex inter-relationship between the cross-border litigation tactics (devised under the 
relevant PIL framework) and the parties’ expectations about the outcome of the relevant 
                                                          
53 Even more complex issues may arise in cross-border cases where there is a dispute about the court’s 
jurisdiction which could inflate litigation costs that might impact on private parties’ access to remedies. See 
more Section 4 below. 
54 Beaumont, Danov, Trimmings and Yüksel, supra n 35. See also: Beaumont and Danov, supra n 11. 
55 See also: T. C. Hartley, International Commercial Litigation (2nd end, CUP, Cambridge 2015) pp 5-6. 
56 Beaumont, Danov, Trimmings and Yüksel, supra n 35. 
57 See more Section 4 below. 
58 Beaumont, Danov, Trimmings and Yüksel, supra n 35. 
59 Danov, supra n 14; Danov and Beaumont, supra n 5. 
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disputes.60  This would in turn be reflected in the ADR/settlement negotiations61 which could 
be further impacted by the cost-shifting rules, ordering ‘the unsuccessful party […] to pay the 
costs of the successful party’.62 For example, since any dispute about the applicable law could 
increase the defendants’ exposure to costs, a level of legal uncertainty about the applicable 
substantive law may force a defendant to settle quickly with a view to minimising the costs.63 
However, the EUPILLAR data suggest that the litigation costs of several millions will be less 
of a factor in high value claims (ie over 100 million).64 In such cases, the defendant might well 
gain a negotiating advantage by exploiting any ambiguity of PIL, in order to adversely affect 
the claimant’s expectations about the outcome of the case.  
Therefore, it can be suggested that, once the parties have considered the value of the legal 
remedies and the impact which the applicable law would make to the outcome of their case, 
they will decide on their respective strategies with regard to the choice-of-law issues. A 
significant difference between the outcomes under the applicable substantive laws which would 
be relevant for the parties’ case would increase the likelihood for them to argue about the 
various aspects of governing law. Considering the strategic behaviour of the parties in cross-
border disputes, there is a strong case that a new data is needed to consider the Brexit impact 
on the parties’ strategies and settlement/ADR negotiations. This deduction may be 
strengthened after considering the relevant case law under the current EU PIL framework. 
There appear to be some governance aspects which due to the strategic nature of the 
parties’ behaviour65 may need to be addressed on both side of the English Channel in the post-
Brexit era. The Homawoo66 case signified the relationship between PIL framework and parties’ 
behaviour showing the impact any legal uncertainty may have on settlements in cross-border 
cases. The point was captured by Mrs Justice Slade. In this case, the English court considered 
the question whether Rome II applies with regard to the assessment of damages which were 
caused by a traffic accident that occurred in France. The High Court judge felt that the law 
applicable to the assessment of damages in cross-border traffic accidents was a significant issue 
                                                          
60 Danov and Barriati, supra n 11. 
61 Danov and Barriati, supra n 11. 
62 See English Civil Procedure Rule (‘CPR’) 44.2(2). See also N Andrews, Andrews on Civil Processes: Court 
Proceedings Vol I (Mortsel, Intersentia, 2013) 526–29; Danov and Beaumont, supra n 6; Danov and Barriati, 
supra n 11. 
63 M. Danov and S. Dnes,  ‘Cross-Border EU Competition Litigation: New Evidence from England and Wales’ 
in M. Danov, F. Becker and P. Beaumont (eds), Cross-Border EU Competition Law Actions (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford 2013) 33-59. 
64 Beaumont, Danov, Trimmings and Yüksel, supra n 35. 
65 Danov and Beaumont, supra n 11; Danov and Barriati, supra n 11. 
66 Homawoo v GMF Assurance SA [2010] EWHC 1941 (QB). 
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because it was “relevant to a large number of actions which ha[d] been commenced in England. 
They [we]re also of relevance in resolving claims without resort to litigation.”67 This further 
shows that any uncertainty with regard to the applicable law would also impact on the parties’ 
willingness to settle and/or continue with the litigation.68 This would be particularly so in cases 
where the amount - at which the parties settle - does depend on the substantive law that applies 
to the merits of the dispute. A settlement is less likely to be reached if the claimant’s entitlement 
(and respectively defendant’s exposure) to damages would vary significantly under the 
competing sets of applicable laws. The relationship between the PIL framework and 
settlements/ADR in cross-border cases was clearly noted by Mrs Justice Slade:  
“Where a tort is alleged, the parties will frequently seek to reach a settlement before commencing 
proceedings. The pre-action protocol for Personal Injury encourages this. Parties may engage in 
mediation. They need to know [which law] applies to the calculation of damages at issue.”69 
 
Although the value of the claim did not appear to be very high in Homawoo, the defendant 
– being an insurance company would have been exposed to a number of similar claims. This 
could explain the time and money which the defendant spent to argue this issue before the 
English court and CJEU. Indeed, there is a strong support for the argument that the parties’ 
decisions whether to embark on a dispute about the applicable law are strategically driven. As 
one interview respondent noted “the parties would only invest time and resources to argue the 
applicable law, if it would make a material difference to the resolution of the dispute.”70 This 
deduction could be strengthened by an analysis of the relevant case law which indicates that 
the parties and their lawyers will often consider the available remedies under the different 
substantive laws which are potentially relevant as being applicable to the merits of the litigants’ 
cross-border dispute.  
The disputes between the parties on PIL issues would be particularly common in cases 
where the PIL rules and/or the relevant institutional framework are not effectively functioning. 
The effectiveness of the PIL regime may be adversely affected by the inconsistent application 
of harmonised PIL instruments by national courts who represent different legal traditions. The 
problems will be amplified, if there is no institutional support for the national judges. Both set 
of problems could be illustrated by examining some of the English cases concerning the 
dichotomy between substance and procedure for PIL purposes.71 It should be noted that, 
traditionally, the questions in respect to assessment of damages were classified as procedural 
                                                          
67 ibid [52]. 
68 Danov, supra n 41. 
69 Homawoo, supra n 51 [46]. See also Case C-412/10, Homawoo v GMF Assurances SA [2011] E.C.R. I-11603 
70 Beaumont, Danov, Trimmings and Yüksel, supra n 35, 90. 
71 R. Garnett, Substance and Procedure in Private International Law (OUP, 2012). 
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issues under English law.72 The EUPILLAR interview data appears to suggest that Article 15 
of Rome II had a positive effect on English PIL73 in providing more legal certainty by 
specifying the scope of the applicable law. On this basis, it may be concluded that the 
application of Rome II in England might have reduced, to an extent, the complexity of disputes 
on what constitutes substance and procedure when determining the parties’ entitlement to 
damages under English PIL.74  
However, a review of the case law suggests that a level of ambiguity (largely influenced 
by the legal traditions in England and Wales) remains. The difficulties concerning the 
interpretation of Articles 1(3) and 15 of Rome II could be illustrated by making reference to 
the judgment of the English and Welsh High Court in Actavis.75 In this case, the claimants 
sought declarations for non-infringement of a patent. The dispute was about the claimant’s 
entitlement to the desired declarations. The difficulties were due to the fact that the designations 
of the relevant patent were France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK. The claimants argued 
that the question whether they were entitled to the desired declaratory relief was to be decided 
under English law because the court had to determine a procedural issue which was outside the 
scope of Rome II. The defendant’s contra-argument was that the issue was a substantive one, 
and Article 15(c) had to apply. It should be noted that, after the jurisdiction had been assumed 
by the English courts,76 the High Court awarded the desired legal remedies to the claimants. 
Although the Court of Appeal77 set the awarded declarations aside, Lord Justice Floyd 
addressed the PIL issue obiter, holding that:  
“142 […] the negative declaration, whilst no doubt a remedy, is not a remedy which falls within 
(c).  
143 The negative declaration is also not within (d), because it is not a measure which the court 
takes to prevent or terminate injury or damage, or provide compensation. Unlike an injunction 
to prevent infringement, it cannot be said that a characteristic of a [declaration for non-
infringement] is that it prevents injury or damage. Moreover paragraph (d) is again concerned 
with the availability of such remedies, not the conditions which must be satisfied for their 
admissibility. 
144 Finally, the mention of limitation periods in paragraph (h) is not a basis for suggesting that 
the conditions of applying for a [declaration for non-infringement] should be brought within the 
lex causae.”78 
 
                                                          
72 See Harding v. Wealands [2006] UKHL 32 (HL), para. 66–67. See more, P.R. Beaumont and Z. Tang, 
‘Classification of Delictual Damages―Harding v Wealands and the Rome II Regulation’, 12 Edinburgh Law 
Review (2008), p. 131, 135. 
73 EUPILLAR – England and Wales - Transcript 19. 
74 Harding, supra n 57.   
75 Actavis UK Ltd and others v Eli Lilly and Co [2015] EWCA Civ 555. 
76 Actavis Group v Eli Lilly & Co [2012] EWHC 3316 aff’d [2013] EWCA Civ 517. 
77 Actavis, supra n 75. 
78 Ibid [142-4]. 
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This case demonstrates how some ambiguous PIL rules may be interpreted by national 
judges who may often be influenced by their legal traditions. These issues need to be thought 
through when devising the UK legal landscape in relation to PIL, whilst considering whether 
England and Wales should remain part of Rome II.  
It should be noted that the UK government intends “to incorporate into domestic law the 
Rome I and II instruments on choice of law and applicable law in contractual and non-
contractual matters.”79 With this in mind, another important issue, which may raise difficult 
interpretation issues and needs to be addressed in the course of this process, concerns the 
presumption that English law is the same as the foreign law. The aspect was put forward in 
OPO v MLA,80 with Lady Justice Arden holding that: 
“The first question is the effect of Article 4(1) in this case. I do not accept the submission that, 
even though there is no evidence as to Ruritanian law, the presumption that foreign law is the 
same as English law does not apply. That is a rule of evidence applied by the English courts. As 
such it is not affected by the Regulation. The choice of law rules laid down by Article 4 apply 
for the purposes set out in Article 15 of the Regulation, which does not extend to rules of 
evidence. Article 22 of the Regulation deals with the burden of proof but only in relation to the 
constituents of the tort in question. […].”81 
   
Although this interpretation appears to be consistent with the EU principle of national 
procedural autonomy,82 one could see some problems with it. More specifically, it could 
undermine the effectiveness of the EU PIL framework which is set for the national judges “to 
designate the same national law irrespective of the country of the court in which an action is 
brought.”83 The limitations of the principle of national procedural autonomy in this respect 
should have been considered, at the very least, by the English courts when determining the 
parties’ entitlement to remedies in cross-border cases. The failure of the Court of Appeal judges 
to do so on this occasion might serve as an example of how inconsistent application of any 
harmonised PIL instrument may undermine the effectiveness of EU PIL. The issues re-
appeared in Lady Chritine Brownlie v Four Seasons Holdings Incorporated.84 In this case, 
Lady Justice Arden – once again without considering the limitations of the principle of national 
procedural autonomy - re-iterated that the presumption of English law being the same as the 
                                                          
79 A future partnership paper, supra 10, [19]. 
80 OPO v MLA [2014] EWCA Civ 1277. 
81 Ibid [108]. 
82 Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland [1976] 
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Community law by Member States’ public authorities: between autonomy and effectiveness’ (2007) 44 CML 
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83 Recital 6 of Rome II. 
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foreign law must be regarded as a rule of evidence and, as a result, outside of the scope of 
Rome II.   
Moreover, the Lady Brownlie case exposed another major weakness of the current EU 
PIL framework which is to be used, in order to determine parties’ entitlement to remedies in 
cross-border cases before the English courts. In order to assume jurisdiction, the courts inter 
alia had to ascertain where the direct damage was sustained by Lady Brownlie who had been 
involved in a traffic accident that occurred in Egypt on 3rd January 2010. As a result of the 
accident, Professor Sir Ian Brownlie and his daughter, Rebecca, died. One preliminary issue 
for the courts to consider was whether Lady Brownlie was entitled to damages under the 
English Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (FAA76). This posed inter alia the question about its 
applicability with regard to an accident which occurred abroad. Lady Justice Arden held that: 
“[…]To obtain an award of damages under the FAA76, […] Lady Brownlie has to show not 
merely that the appellant was liable to Sir Ian Brownlie, but also that she was dependent on the 
deceased.  
[…] Her claim for damages is not a derivative claim in the way that in Dumez the shareholder's 
claim for reflective loss was derived from the subsidiary's loss. A reflective loss claim simply 
mirrors the loss of the original victim: dependency does not have to be shown. 
[…] Lady Brownlie's FAA76 claim is not properly described as for consequential loss. It is for 
an independent loss.  
87 If I am correct in my conclusion regarding Lady Brownlie's FAA76 claim, she has 
established a good arguable case that English law applies to it. It is unnecessary to consider 
Article 4(3) of Rome II in relation to this claim.”85 
 
It is difficult to see why the FAA76 was considered applicable in the first place, if the 
accident occurred in Egypt. Although, the language of the judgments (as outlined above) 
clearly shows that Lady Justice Arden was not entirely sure what the correct interpretation is, 
her Ladyship refused to exercise a discretion and make a reference to the CJEU by submitting 
that this procedure would “involve a considerable delay”86 There is no doubt that suing in 
England was important for the claimant to obtain an effective legal remedy. The outcome 
appears to be fair and just in protecting the weaker party who was dependant on the deceased, 
That said, the interpretation of PIL rules seems to fly in the face of Rome II which strongly 
suggests that the direct damage occurred in Egypt, and – as a result - Egyptian law should have 
been applied to determine the remedies which the claimant would be entitled to recover.87  
A case for an institutional reform may be strengthened by noting that, despite the EU 
policy-makers’ objective to enhance  the legal certainty with regard to the applicable law – 
                                                          
85 Ibid [86-87] – the emphasis added by the author. 
86 Ibid [92]. 
87 Case C-350/14 Florin Lazar v Allianz SpA ECLI:EU:C:2015:802, discussed further by P. Beaumont and B. 
Yüksel, ‘Cross-border Civil and Commercial Disputes Before the Court of Justice of the European Union’ in 
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through harmonisation of PIL rules,88 there may often be gaps in the legal framework which 
could be exploited by the parties in disputes with an international element. This means that the 
national judges’ interpretation of any harmonised EU PIL instrument could make a difference 
to the law which would be ascertained as applicable. This would in turn directly impact on the 
substantive outcome of the dispute. The point could be illustrated by the decision of the English 
court in the Print Concept89 case which was decided under the Rome Convention. In this case, 
the real issue was whether the claimant was entitled to a legal remedy, but formal dispute 
between the parties was about the interpretation of the Rome Convention to a distribution 
agreement (which contained no choice of law agreement). The problem - which was seemingly 
driving parties’ litigation strategies - was summarised in the first paragraph of the judgment 
rendered by Lord Justice Longmore who stated that:   
“The answer to the [question which law governs the merits of the dispute] is said to be of 
importance because the contract has now terminated and, if German law governs the contract, 
GEW will have to pay an indemnity assessed as a proportion of the average contractual turnover 
while the contract lasted, whereas no such indemnity is said to be payable if the contract is 
governed by English law.”90 
 
In other words, the claimant in Print Concept would have only been entitled to a remedy, 
if German law had been applicable. On the contrary, if English law had to be applied, the 
claimant not only would be entitled to no remedy, but also would have to pay the defendant’s 
litigation costs in line with the cost-shifting rules in England and Wales. This meant that the 
difference between the substantive outcomes under German law and, respectively, English law 
was so stark that the parties would be prepared to exploit any ambiguity in the PIL framework 
with a view to winning the dispute about the applicable law because a decision on the PIL issue 
would have pre-determined the outcome of the whole cross-border case.  
The deduction that the parties’ entitlement to a remedy, which is to be ascertained by the 
governing law, is a central issue that shapes the parties’ strategies could be further sustained 
by an analysis of the claimants’ tactics in cross-border matrimonial disputes before the English 
courts. In the S v S91 case, the wife - being the financially weaker party - was determined to 
issue proceeding in London where the English judges normally apply English law. This would 
have ensured a higher level of compensation for her, on this occasion. On the contrary, the 
husband was strongly-minded to contest the jurisdiction of the English courts and sue in France. 
                                                          
88 See Rome I and Rome II. 
89 Print Concept GmbH v GEW (EC) Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 352.  
90 Ibid [1]. 
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What seemingly looked like a heavy jurisdictional battle was largely a dispute about the amount 
of the wife’s financial remedy/compensation.  
Mr Justice Mostyn was no doubt right to criticise Brussels IIa’s “iron inflexibility” 92 
which is being exploited by “the parties in divorce cases [who often] engage in […] extensive, 
expensive and futile manoeuvres”.93  Whilst undoubtedly the court-first-seised rule needs to be 
reconsidered by the EU legislators,94 one could equally criticise the inflexibility of the English 
PIL which does not allow English courts to apply foreign law in cross-border matrimonial 
proceedings. Due to this, it is a fairly safe prediction that, in the post-Brexit context, the 
jurisdictional battles may well continue, with the parties having long-lasting forum non-
conveniens disputes in cross-border disputes before the English courts.  
Could Brexit be an opportunity for the UK policy-makers to adopt “special substantive 
rules for multistate problems,”95 which would allow English judges to take into account foreign 
laws when determining the financially weaker parties’ entitlement to remedies in cross-border 
disputes? In a similar vein, a reform could allow national judges to take account of foreign 
mandatory rules (even if they were in conflict with the UK PIL rules), provided that the foreign 
legal order has a legitimate interest to regulate the relevant cross-border activities.96 Such a 
reform could reduce the situations where the English and Welsh judges apply their own law (ie 
lex fori) when determining the rights and obligations of the parties. This may promote justice 
in cross-border cases by ensuring that an appropriate set of laws applies irrespective of the 
place where the parties litigate, whilst defeating parties’ attempts to engage in forum shopping.  
The need for more flexibility for the judges to dispense justice when determining the 
rights and obligations of the parties in cross-border cases is yet another point which must be 
considered in the course of the post-Brexit review of the PIL framework. Giving national judges 
more flexibility when ascertaining the applicable law in appropriate cross-border disputes 
might be worth considering in this context. Gathering some relevant empirical data could help 
the UK policy-makers decide how to shape the post-Brexit legal landscape in relation to PIL.  
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4 Access to a Legal Remedy: Where to Sue and When/Whether to Settle 
There would be two elements of access to remedies in cross-border cases. First, it would be 
particularly important for the parties to have their disputes heard and determined swiftly. 
Secondly, once a final judgment is rendered, the parties would be strongminded to have their 
rights recognised and enforced effectively in other jurisdictions. The impact of Brexit on both 
elements must be carefully considered. 
The S v S case97 (which was already discussed) indicates the substantive law advantages 
for the claimant may reflexively bring out disadvantages for the defendant. Lord Justice Thorpe 
has identified the issues in matrimonial disputes by stating: 
“Of course some European jurisdictions will be regarded as a happy land for an applicant or, put 
the other way, a bad land for a respondent. No doubt this wife would have preferred her financial 
provision to have been determined by a London judge.”98 
 
In other words, if the English courts are a venue of choice for the financially weaker 
parties, then they would not be the preferred adjudicators for their opponents which means that 
some other courts would be more preferable for the financially stronger parties. This may well 
explain the rationale behind the heavily contested jurisdictional battles in cross-border 
matrimonial disputes in England and Wales. One might go a step further and submit that 
proceedings before an effective and efficient national court will increase the defendant’s 
exposure to damages.  
The pre-Brexit data indicates that, once a party to a cross-border relationship has decided 
that he would be entitled to a legal remedy, the probability to access the desired remedy would 
be the most important consideration impacting on the claimant’s decision where to sue in cross-
border cases. In the latter context, the applicable set/s of procedural and evidential rules, which 
may vary - reflecting the different legal traditions across the EU, could be the most important 
variable to be considered as part of the forum selection process. More importantly, the 2017 
EU Justice Scoreboard99 indicates that some jurisdictions may be more efficient than others. 
Furthermore, it is well established that the national judges’ qualifications and experience may 
well differ across the EU100 which reflects the existing level of diversity in the process of 
administration of justice101 and the recruitment process for national adjudicators in different 
EU Member States. This means that issuing proceedings at one place rather than another may 
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impact on the outcome of the case102 which may explain why well advised claimants might be 
highly selective when deciding where to bring their cross-border claims.  
There is a strong case that a higher value of the remedies - which a party is entitled to 
recover - will increase the likelihood for such a party to issue proceedings before an effective 
and efficient national court, in order to access his desired legal remedy within a reasonable 
time.103 Given the cross-border nature of the business activities, claimants with high value 
claims and deep pockets (or ready access to finance which may be provided by one of the 
various litigation funders) may often have a choice where to issue the proceedings, considering 
the relevant applicable procedural laws and the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the 
particular judicial system.104 As a result, some EU jurisdictions appear to be continuously 
attracting more complex cross-border cases than others. This has had an impact on the ability 
of the lawyers in these jurisdictions to appropriately handle cross-border cases.  
The English judges, barristers and solicitors have a renowned reputation for dealing with 
difficult cross-border disputes, applying the different EU PIL instruments. England and Wales 
has gradually established itself as a venue of choice for claimants with high value cross-border 
disputes.105 The link between the place of litigation and private parties’ access to remedies 
might be even more of a factor in cases involving non-EU parties. The point was put forward 
in a recent jurisdictional battle, which involved multiple claimants from Zambia, whose access 
to legal remedies was dependant on establishing jurisdiction in England. In this case, Mr Justice 
Coulson106 had no doubt that having the dispute heard and determined in England was central 
to claimants’ access to remedies. The High Court judge’s view was reiterated by the Court of 
Appeal, with Lord Justice Simon holding: “There must come a time when access to justice in 
this type of case will not be achieved by exporting cases, but by the availability of local lawyers, 
experts, and sufficient funding to enable the cases to be tried locally.” 
The fact that parties with strong (or relatively strong) claims may be willing to issue 
proceedings in jurisdictions where judges could effectively and efficiently hear and determine 
their cross-border dispute would impact on the tactics/behaviour of their opponents. In 
particular, the parties against whom a strong (or relatively strong) claim is to be issued might 
have incentives to seise a national court which is less than effective and efficient in handling 
cross-border disputes, challenging the jurisdiction of the court seised by the other party and 
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hoping to adversely affect his expectations about the outcome of the case. Therefore, a level of 
tactical manoeuvring may be displayed by the opponents of the parties with strong (and 
relatively strong) claims.  
Whilst the issues concerning the parties’ strategic behaviour in cross-border matrimonial 
disputes were already highlighted above, it should be noted that the picture is not very different 
in civil and commercial disputes before the English courts. It appears that the parties have 
disputed the competence of the English court to hear and determine their disputes in over 80% 
of the cases in EUPILLAR datasets.107 Particularly difficult issues may arise in high-value 
disputes, involving sophisticated parties because a defendant faced with a high value claim 
would typically be less prone to economise on litigation costs, exploiting any uncertainty in 
the interpretation of the PIL with a view to gaining a negotiating advantage.108 Due to the 
increasingly complex nature of the cross-border business activities (or relationships between 
individuals), there could be a level of ambiguity as to how the jurisdictional rules of Brussels 
Ia (or Brussels IIa) would be interpreted.109 The knowledge of legal advisers combined with 
the higher level of complexity which characterises the disputes with an international element 
may allow the parties to devise litigation strategies which exploit the ambiguities and/or the 
weaknesses of the PIL rules.110 Indeed, the stronger the claim and greater its value for the 
claimant, the higher the incentives for the defendant to challenge the jurisdiction with a view 
to deflating the claimants’ expectations about the outcome of the dispute which could have an 
impact on his access to legal remedies.111  
EUPILLAR did not merely detect the fact that many of the cross-border cases (as well 
as the domestic cases) settle in England and Wales, but went further in trying to identify certain 
aspects of the PIL framework which could be exploited by the parties to impact on their 
opponents’ expectations about the outcome of the dispute. It seems that the various 
jurisdictional challenges, which may or may not involve parallel proceedings elsewhere, appear 
to be playing an important role in this context. There is a case that, even if a jurisdictional 
challenge was wholly or partially unsuccessful, this may cause a level of delay which might 
make the claimant more willing to make a compromise and settle, in order to put the dispute 
behind him.112 More importantly, a successful jurisdictional challenge might significantly 
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impact on the willingness of the claimant to continue litigating elsewhere. This means that they 
could give up on a claim or settle by agreeing on a significant discount.  This is an important 
aspect which needs to be considered when assessing the Brexit impact on the parties’ access to 
justice because the EUPILLAR civil and commercial dataset indicates that the defendants’ 
jurisdictional challenges were wholly or partly successful in over 30% of the relevant cases 
under the EU PIL framework.113  
Therefore, the EUPILLAR data appears to demonstrate how strategic litigants could 
exploit the ambiguity of the current EU PIL framework and the deficiencies of some of the EU 
Member States’ judicial systems in order to adversely affect their opponents’ access to legal 
remedies in cross-border cases.114 On this basis, one hypothesis may be that any fresh legal 
uncertainty arising out of the UK decision to leave the EU could be exploited by private parties 
in cross-border cases. Although the EU PIL framework is not without its weaknesses,115 it is 
now well established that one of the main successes of the EU PIL framework is that it has 
facilitated the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments116 by relying “on the principle 
of mutual trust”.117  
One potential consequence of Brexit would be non-application of Brussels Ia and IIa in 
the UK which might mean that there would be a higher level of legal uncertainty about the 
enforceability of an English judgment in the EU Member States.  This might depreciate the 
value of the English and Welsh courts’ judgments which may not be circulating freely across 
the EU post-Brexit. This could in turn impact on the litigants’ decisions whether to sue in 
England. New empirical data is much needed to test all these hypotheses, considering how a 
change in the legal landscape in relation to PIL (and potential/actual non-application of 
Brussels I and/or II) would impact on the attractiveness of the English courts and the relevant 
settlement dynamics.  
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5 Governance Aspects: The legal landscape in relation to PIL and Brexit 
Implications 
The EU experience shows that effective and efficient adjudication service providers are highly 
likely to benefit from a process of adjudicatory competition which may be promoted by a level 
of enhanced judicial cooperation. London has clearly specialised in providing cross-border 
legal services.118 That said, the UK decision to leave the EU might be seen as an example 
demonstrating that any system for judicial cooperation could be susceptible to political risks. 
This signifies that the questions about various governance aspects of cross-border litigation 
and optimal policy-options must be addressed head-on by the policy-makers.119 The issues 
which need to be considered, as part of this process, could be identified by examining the pre-
Brexit data which should be used as a foundation for any analysis of the future post-Brexit data. 
The EUPILLAR project120 shows that any deficiencies in the functioning of certain 
national judicial systems could have negative spill-over effects through the agreed mechanism 
for judicial co-operation among different legal systems in cross-border cases. For example, the 
EU PIL framework may be less than effective if the judges in some EU Member States have 
insufficient experience in applying EU PIL in so far as any judgment misapplying EU PIL rules 
may be circulating freely across the EU. Similarly, private parties’ access to remedies may be 
impaired by the various deficiencies in the way the national judicial systems are functioning in 
the EU Member States,121 where the problems are being caused by the excessive delay of the 
courts to decide on jurisdiction.122  
In other words, a major finding of the EUPILLAR project is that a level of judicial co-
operation without an effectively functioning institutional framework in place means that any 
deficiencies in the functioning of a particular national judicial system may be exported (through 
a PIL instrument based on the principle of mutual trust), impairing (rather than facilitating) 
private parties’ access to remedies in cross-border cases. The court-first-seised rule may create 
incentives for parties to issue first before courts which are less than efficient in progressing the 
dispute to a final judgment.123 This would directly impact on their opponents expectations 
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about the outcome of the case.124 Since the Brussels Ia and IIa are heavily reliant on the court-
first-seised rule125 with a view to avoiding concurrent proceedings, the strategic litigants may 
well become selective when deciding where to bring their cross-border claims.126  
Problems may arise in cases where there is no exclusive choice-of-court agreement 
between parties. The inflexibility of the EU PIL instruments to allow, in such cases, for the 
relevant cross-border civil and commercial proceedings (or cross-border matrimonial 
proceedings) to be transferred to an effectively functioning and appropriate jurisdiction may 
be a real issue which may occasionally encourage abusive litigation tactics,127 impeding 
litigants’ access to effective remedies in cross-border cases. The rigidness of the court-first-
seised rule, under the current EU PIL framework, means that the judges may have no effective 
tools to defeat abusive litigation tactics under the current EU PIL regime. If the more 
appropriate court to hear and determine a cross-border dispute was second seised within the 
meaning of Brussels Ia and IIa, then this court must stay its proceeding irrespective of the fact 
that it might take more than 5 years for the court-first-seised to render a judgment.128  
A real issues is that, even if it is clear that one of the parties is engaging in abusive 
litigation tactics, the domestic procedural tools (eg anti-suit injunctions) set to defeat such 
strategies would not be available. This would be so despite the silence of the EU PIL 
Regulations on this issue (ie the unavailability of any EU PIL measure specifically designated 
to defeat abusive litigation tactics) and the principle of national procedural autonomy which 
could have been interpreted as allowing national judges to rely upon their domestic procedural 
devices, avoiding abusive litigation tactics and facilitating access to justice. In other words, an 
unintended consequence of the current EU PIL framework is that (whilst promoting a level of 
adjudication competition through the court-first-seised rule) it reduces the regulatory 
competition for domestic procedural devices which are set to defeat abusive litigation tactics. 
In so far as the principle of mutual trust may be used to neutralise various domestic mechanisms 
(addressing abusive litigation tactics), one could regard this type of “harmonisation […] as 
anti-competitive”.129  
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The unavailability of any EU PIL measure/s specifically designated to defeat abusive 
litigation tactics in cases where there is no exclusive choice-of-court agreement, 130 could be 
exploited by strategic parties to generate a delay with a view to impacting on their opponents’ 
expectations about the outcome of the case which would have a bearing on any ADR/settlement 
negotiations. Therefore, continuous harmonisation without setting up an appropriate 
institutional framework could become counter-productive in making the EU civil justice 
system less than effective, encouraging abusive litigation tactics. This could adversely affect 
private parties’ effective access to legal remedies in cross-border cases. These issues would 
consistently undermine the role of litigation in the EU, increasing the perception of arbitration 
as a more appropriate mode for transnational dispute resolution.131  
Therefore, it is as important as ever for the UK to consider whether it should remain an 
important part of the EU PIL framework, if it has no say (or less of a say) on how the EU PIL 
institutional framework should be reformed with a view to facilitating private parties’ access 
to remedies in cross-border cases. One the one hand, the EU experience demonstrates that the 
harmonisation of EU PIL brings some advantages in terms of a higher level of co-ordination 
of judicial proceedings and a greater degree of certainty for enforcement of foreign judgments. 
On the other hand, there are real issues concerning the administration of justice in cross-border 
disputes with an international element within the EU which must be addressed head-on by 
EU/UK policy-makers. There is a strong case that the effectiveness of the EU PIL framework 
could be adversely affected by the inability of the EU Member States to agree upon a well-
functioning institutional architecture which addresses the deficiencies of some national judicial 
systems.  
It is a significant issue that the adopted PIL instruments may often be a result of a 
compromise achieved at EU level.132 The stakes for some of the EU Member States, when it 
comes to negotiations of PIL instruments, could be high – because, due to the level of diversity 
in the EU, any change in the EU PIL regime could result in higher implementation costs in 
some jurisdictions. The ‘societal costs’133 would be particularly high if the adopted PIL 
instruments contain rules that are significantly different from the relevant PIL rules (which are 
reflecting their legal traditions) in some EU Member States PIL. Long-lasting negotiations 
between the EU Member States when PIL instruments are being adopted show that PIL is not 
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immune from the political risks which may result from the inability of the EU Member States 
to agree upon the approval of certain mechanisms and/or rules. All these issues might re-appear 
in the course of the Brexit negotiations.  
The difficulties may be exacerbated, if the problems are not clearly identified by UK/EU 
policy-makers. The UK decision to leave the EU will have important implications in the area 
of PIL, adversely affecting private parties’ access to remedies in cross-border cases in the UK 
and EU. In particular, the UK could potentially lose its access to the most developed system 
for judicial cooperation which has been developed under the auspices of the European Union 
since the adoption of the Brussels Convention 1968 (i.e. over a period of nearly 50 years). But, 
some of the academics in England appear to be underestimating the scale of the problems for 
litigants and legal practitioners. Fentiman submitting that “a key aspect […] is what law 
governs the substance of the dispute. It is still the case—and I cannot see rationally that this 
would be affected by Brexit—that people want and will want English substantive law […]”134 
to apply to the merits of their cross-border disputes. Briggs has taken a similar view, noting: 
“58. If there is to be a marginal loss in terms of the European passporting rules for English 
judgments, the corresponding gains may be seen – in enforcement of judgments – in terms of 
more effective measures for English[…] enforcement.  
59. In terms of jurisdiction, there will be pure gain: in wider and better rules of English 
jurisdiction, to say nothing of anti-suit injunctions in those cases in which it is necessary to put 
the stick about. Dispute-resolution agreements are being drafted and refined to meet the 
challenge of what may lie ahead; and the rules which apply to the merits will be practically the 
same as before.  
60. If that is correct, it will be seen that though secession from the European Union may, and 
probably will, have unpredictable consequences for the broad economy, and for public law, a 
radical reform of the effective rules of private international law is not on the cards. […]”135 
 
The problem is that such submissions/assumptions may not be quite precise because, 
even if Rome I and II were incorporated into English law post-Brexit, the choice-of-law rules 
will only indicate which law would apply to the merits. If English law were to apply, then the 
Draft European Union (Withdrawal) Bill136 indicates that this might not be the same as it is 
now (after all, EU law forms part of English law at present, but it appears this will gradually 
change137). The point was put forward by Lord Thomas when giving evidence to the UK 
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Parliament’s EU Justice Sub-Committee.138 In particular, his Lordship appeared to suggest that, 
bearing in mind the evolving nature of EU law, it is to be carefully assessed how any potential 
variation between the UK Supreme Court jurisprudence and the CJEU jurisprudence would 
impact on the parties’ willingness to choose English law.139 The problems could be exacerbated 
by the fact that Section 6(2) of the Draft European Union (Withdrawal) Bill states that “A court 
or tribunal need not have regard to anything done on or after exit day by the European Court, 
another EU entity or the EU but may do so if it considers it appropriate to do so.”140 
Indeed, Brexit might have an impact on the attractiveness of London as a venue of choice 
in some EU law related disputes.141 The most obvious example is the follow-on cross-border 
EU competition law claims for damages which are normally preceded by a decision of the 
European Commission establishing an EU competition law infringement.142 Equally, difficult 
issues, post-Brexit, may need to be considered in the context of the recognition and 
enforcement of an English judgment applying EU competition law. Could the losing party in 
the English proceedings delay (or even ask a German court to deny) the recognition and 
enforcement of an English judgment because it, allegedly, misapplied EU competition law 
(which were to apply under the relevant PIL rules), post-Brexit? A carefully designed model 
for data analysis and further empirical data are much needed to assess the potential and actual 
impact of Brexit in the area of cross-border litigation. 
A new data is needed to find out what the impact of these changes will be on the pattern 
of cross-border litigation in England. The need for further research can be strengthened by the 
views expressed by the English Bar Council Brexit Working Group143 which suggest that 
“some market participants might consider moving away from English law as the governing law 
of asset purchase and sale arrangements in securitisation”.144 This might impact on the parties’ 
forum-selection process, with the Bar Council noting that:   
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“There is an increased risk that commercial parties’ negotiated and contractually agreed English 
jurisdiction clauses will not be respected by the courts in Member States and that the parties are 
more likely to become embroiled in proceedings in a court other than the court that they have 
chosen. This is demonstrated by the survey conducted by members of Simmons & Simmons’ 
offices in Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands as to their courts’ approach to 
English jurisdiction clauses post-Brexit which revealed that over 50% of clients were considering 
moving away from English choice of law or jurisdiction clauses.”145 
 
This indicates that some of the remaining EU Member States’ courts may benefit from 
the process of adjudicatory competition by attracting some claims which would have otherwise 
been litigated in London.  
That said, there are some important issues which must be addressed in the EU. Brexit 
may reduce the overall effectiveness of the EU Civil Justice system because, without 
appropriate arrangements being put in place, the EU might no longer be able to rely on the 
English courts and some of the world leading judges146 to dispense justice in cross-border cases 
within the Union. The high level of complexity which characterises the contemporary disputes 
with an international element leaves no doubt that the English legal practitioners play an 
important role in facilitating private parties’ access to justice in the EU. Nonetheless, Hess and 
Requejo-Isidro have submitted that:  
“From the European perspective, there is now a need to carefully evaluate the benefits of a 
bilateral agreement with the United Kingdom on issues of private international law. The main 
interest of the Union won’t be to maintain or to strengthen London’s dominant position in the 
European judicial market: EU Member States might equally provide for modern and highly-
qualified legal services ready to attract commercial litigants and high-value litigation & 
arbitration. Examples in this respect are The Netherlands and Sweden.  
[…] there might be much more interest on the English side in negotiating with the Union than 
the other way around.”147 
 
It is alarming that some of the leading PIL academics are more concerned with the impact 
of Brexit on the market for cross-border legal/litigation services (and process of competition 
between various service providers) rather than with the impact on access to justice in cross-
border cases. In line with the approach taken by Hess and Requejo-Isidro, Merrett submits: 
“It is a competitive market [for litigation services]. Singapore is actively competing for business, 
for example, and within Europe the Dutch courts are developing a specialty in collective action 
and redress. However, we are such a long way ahead at the moment that it is not much of a threat.  
The other thing to remember is that there is a disadvantage in Europe because their judgments 
will not be automatically enforceable in England. That will be a disadvantage for the other 
European jurisdictions trying to compete with us.”148 
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But, with respect, all these views appear to be underestimating the scale of the problem 
for a significant number of businesses and individuals who seem to be making a recourse to 
the English courts when seeking legal remedies in cross-border cases.149 In particular, Brexit 
may bring some fresh legal uncertainty because any change in the legal landscape may generate 
a level of ambiguity with regard to issues of jurisdiction, choice-of-law, recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments and, more importantly, rights and obligation of the parties 
in cross-border cases.  
Post-Brexit some litigants may adjust their strategies to reflect any such fresh legal 
uncertainty which would inflate cross-border litigation risks and costs. Both issues of 
jurisdiction and applicable substantive law/s may be subject to heated debates (ie higher level 
of uncertainty and costs) in the post-Brexit era which could impair private parties’ access to 
justice in cross-border cases. In particular, the individuals and businesses that were reliant on 
cross-border adjudication services offered by English courts and law firms may have to cope 
with higher litigation risks which may adversely affect the cross-border economic activities 
within the EU, increasing the costs for businesses that are active in different Member States. It 
is a relatively safe assumption that the higher costs will be passed onto the end consumers 
(adversely affecting consumers’ welfare across the EU).  
Therefore, without an appropriate level of cooperation between the UK and EU policy-
makers, there would inevitably be major implications of Brexit for the administration of justice 
in cross-border cases in the UK and EU. Indeed, if the existing data150 overwhelmingly suggests 
that London is one of the leading litigation centres in the EU, then the UK withdrawal from the 
EU PIL framework will have a significant impact on the private parties’ access to legal 
remedies in cross-border cases within the EU. In particular, a level of delay and higher litigation 
costs may have an adverse effect on one of the parties’ (or even on both parties’) willingness 
to initiate legal proceedings or continue with the process of litigation.  
6 Setting the Post-Brexit Research Agenda in PIL  
The access to justice in cross-border cases is becoming a real issue, which policy-makers across 
the Globe would need to address head-on. The need for an enhanced co-operation between 
UK/EU policy-makers, who should work together to set up the institutional framework in 
relation to PIL, could be strengthened by pointing out the increasing complexity of the disputes 
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arising out of business relationships with an international element. An example illustrating this 
is a recent jurisdictional dispute in a case involving environmental pollution in Africa. In this 
case, the corporate structure of the Shell Group of companies had to be considered with a view 
to determining whether the English courts should assume jurisdiction. As a part of the fact-
finding process, it was noted that “[w]ithin the corporate family of Shell companies, there are 
1367 different companies which are located in 101 different countries.”151 Indeed, there appear 
to be some very complex issues concerning the  administration of justice in relation to cross-
border business activities, which raise issues about the liability of multinational groups of 
companies in cases where a mass harm has been caused across the EU (or across the Globe).  
PIL rules which provide for an appropriate level of judicial cooperation between diverse 
national legal systems would be central to the creation of an effectively functioning PIL regime 
that facilitates access to justice in cross-border cases. The territorial competence of national 
policy-makers’ regulatory powers makes it increasingly difficult for them to create a legal 
landscape for cross-border cases which would have pan-European and/or global implications. 
There is a case for the policy-makers to act and agree upon a new model of judicial cooperation 
to apply between the EU and UK in a post-Brexit era.152 This poses the question: What is an 
appropriate (and/or) optimal level of judicial cooperation which the EU/UK policy-makers 
should aim to achieve post-Brexit?  
The real issue for the UK policy-makers is how to facilitate private parties’ effective 
access to remedies in cross-border cases in the post-Brexit era, whilst leaving the most 
advanced system for a regional judicial co-operation and deciding on any alternative 
arrangements which should be made with the EU in relation to PIL. There could be an adverse 
impact on access to justice in cross-border cases before the English courts. The relevant issues 
should be clearly identified by analysing newly gathered empirical data. As part of this process, 
the PIL scholars should carefully consider how a change in the legal landscape will impact on 
the triangular relationship between the rules of jurisdiction and choice-of-law (ie PIL rules 
shaping litigants’ strategies) and the parties’ access to their desired legal remedies in cross-
border cases (including the possibility to have the rendered judgment recognised and enforced 
abroad which might potentially impact on the forum selection process).  In this context, the 
policy-makers should consider what lessons could be learnt from their experience with the EU 
PIL framework (i.e. the most advanced regional framework for judicial co-operation). 
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Once the issues (impeding private parties’ effective access to legal remedies in the post-
Brexit era) have been identified, it will be possible to take an informed view about the optimal 
policy option/s which should be pursued in developing the legal landscape in relation to PIL. 
The EU experience has shown that setting up an effectively functioning PIL framework 
presupposes an appropriate institutional architecture which allows national judges, whilst 
dealing with any abusive litigation tactics, to swiftly establish jurisdiction and ascertain 
applicable law in cross-border cases. In order for the policy-makers to take an informed view 
on how the post-Brexit legal landscape in relation to PIL should be designed, they must 
consider how a change in the legal landscape would shape the litigants’ strategies, assessing 
the effect it has on ADR/settlement negotiations (and private parties’ access to remedies). This 
should allow the EU/UK policy-makers to appropriately shape the EU/UK legal landscape in 
relation to PIL post-Brexit, whilst taking a lead in developing the global landscape. 
 
 
